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Abstract 
Studies of on-the-job training have found that low skilled workers participate less in further training. 
In this paper, we develop a signalling model of training where training can increase productivity when 
workers’ prior ability matches the level of the training course. Consequently, employers can use 
observed training participation as information about the quality of their employees when job 
performance is unobservable. As a result, programs aimed at low ability workers will be underutilized 
because of the negative signal participation conveys about their initial ability. We show that offering 
training has spillover effects: introducing high-level courses to a choice set of only low-level courses 
increases participation in low-level courses, and improves sorting efficiency. We discuss the 
implications of these results for optimal training provision, and make several testable predictions for 
assessing the validity of our model. 
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1. Introduction 
With the increased importance of a well-trained workforce due to skill-biased technological change 
(Acemoglu, 2002; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003), it has become 
essential for low ability workers to upgrade their skills. However, empirical studies on training 
participation consistently show that low skilled workers participate less in further training than their 
high skilled colleagues (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999; 
Bassanini et al., 2007). A recent report from the OECD and the European Commission based on 
PIAAC data shows that people with high skills are three to five times more likely to participate in 
adult learning activities than low skilled individuals (OECD and European Commission, 2013). 
Currently, research on on-the-job training explains low training participation of low skilled workers 
through individual differences in preferences and personality (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and 
Ter Weel, 2008; Colquitt, LePine, and Noe, 2000; Fouarge, Schils, and de Grip, 2013). Since 
preferences and personality are relatively invariable (Meier and Sprenger, 2015; Borghans et al., 
2008), this explanation implies that the potential for effectively stimulating the low skilled is limited. 
In this paper, we develop a signalling model of on-the-job training as an alternative 
explanation for why low skilled workers participate less in training. We argue that training can 
increase workers’ productivity when workers’ prior ability matches the level of the training course. 
Consequently, employers can use observed training participation as information about the quality of 
their employees when job performance is (partially) unobservable. Employees will therefore 
incorporate this signalling value of signing up for courses of different levels into their participation 
decision. As a result, low ability employees do not sign up for training that is effective at improving 
their skills because of the negative signal training participation conveys about their initial ability. 
This idea offers potential for increasing the training participation of low skilled workers 
through interventions, in contrast with the preference based explanation. We show that the availability 
of different types of training attenuates the signal of each particular training program. The intuition 
behind this result is that in a situation where employees can choose between a basic, low-level, course 
and not participating in any training, introducing an advanced training program stimulates employees 
at the high end of the ability distribution to sign up for advanced training. This decreases the average 
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ability of those who do not take any training, making the option of not taking training less attractive. 
Basic training then becomes relatively more attractive for those at the low end of the skills 
distribution. Therefore, offering training has spillover effects: introducing advanced courses increases 
participation in basic courses. This implies that low skilled workers can be effectively targeted once 
employers are aware of the signalling function of training. 
Our model leads to several empirically testable predictions. First, employees for whom the 
signal is more important will participate less in low level training, and more in high level training, 
than those for whom the signal is less important. This implies, for example, that low skilled 
employees in industries where performance is harder to observe will participate less in training that is 
geared towards low skilled workers than in industries where performance is more easily observable. It 
also implies that employees that are on a fixed term contract are predicted to sort into advanced 
training more than their colleagues on permanent contracts. Second, in companies which offer a 
higher variety of training programs, participation rates among employees will be higher. Third, 
employers that offer and stimulate more advanced training opportunities will have a higher average 
level of productivity, independent of the effectiveness of the advanced training programs. 
Our study contributes to the literature on the determinants of on-the-job training and to the 
literature on signalling. While there have been many papers on on-the-job training from a human 
capital or screening perspective (e.g. Becker, 1962; Hashimoto, 1981; Acemoglu, 1997; Acemoglu 
and Pischke, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Autor, 2001; Leuven, 2005), few studies acknowledge the potential 
signalling function of on-the-job-training from the worker’s perspective. In doing so, we provide a 
novel explanation for the low participation rate of low skilled employees. This insight can be used by 
policy makers as well as companies in the private sector to more effectively tailor training to their low 
skilled employees.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
relevant literature and motivation for our model. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 discusses 
the empirical predictions and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Background Literature and Motivation 
In this section we discuss the theories that have been put forward explaining why low skilled 
employees sign up for on-the-job training less, and evaluate their empirical support. Firstly, we look 
at whether employers are less willing to invest in training for their low skilled workers. Secondly, we 
consider the explanation that the returns to training in terms of wages or future career outcomes are 
lower for low skilled workers. Thirdly, we discuss the explanation that low skilled workers participate 
less because of differences in preferences, personality traits, and motivation that are related to the 
decision to participate in training.  
One of the reasons that low skilled workers receive less on-the-job training could be that 
employers are unwilling to offer them training. Hashimoto (1981), following Becker (1962), 
developed a model in which employers and employees share the costs and gains of training, and 
training only occurs when the predicted gains outweigh the costs for both parties. In practice, it could 
be that the predicted gains from training for the employer are too low when training low skilled 
employees, and this may result in less training opportunities for low skilled workers. However, most 
empirical studies investigating the supply side of training do not find a difference in the willingness of 
employers to provide training for workers of different levels of skill. Using Dutch data, Maximiano 
(2011) finds that different training rates between workers of different education levels reflect 
differences in the workers’ demand for training, rather than differences in employers’ willingness to 
supply training. Leuven and Oosterbeek (2000) also conclude that firms do not have strong 
preferences with regard to education levels when supplying training in The Netherlands, Canada, 
United States and Switzerland using data from the IALS. For Italy, Croce and Tancioni (2007) also 
find the educational level unrelated to willingness of employers to provide training. All in all, the 
available empirical evidence does not favour employers’ unwillingness to provide training 
opportunities as an explanation for the low training incidence of lower skilled workers. 
Another explanation put forward is that low skilled employees train less because the expected 
returns for this group are lower than for high skilled employees. In this case low skilled employees 
will demand less training even though employers would be happy to supply it. The empirical evidence 
for this explanation is mixed. In an early study, Lynch (1992) finds no difference in the returns to 
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training in terms of wages for workers of different levels of education in the United States. Fouarge et 
al. (2013) reach the same conclusion using Dutch data. Other studies do find that highly educated 
workers benefit more from taking training in terms of wage. Arulampalam and Booth (2001) find that 
the returns to training in Britain are largest for highly educated young men. For Germany, Kuckulenz 
and Zwick (2004) show that high skilled workers benefit more from training than low skilled workers. 
However there are also studies that find the opposite relationship. Budría and Pereira (2007) show that 
in Portugal returns to training are larger for low educated workers. Similarly, the OECD (OECD, 
1999) and Brunello (2004) both report higher returns for low educated workers using international 
data from several European countries. In sum, the explanation that low skilled workers sign up less 
for training because of lower returns is not convincingly supported by the empirical literature. 
The last explanation put forth in the literature is that low skilled workers differ from high 
skilled workers in terms of personality, motivation, and economic preferences. These factors in turn 
are related to people’s willingness to engage in further training. The empirical evidence seems to 
provide support for this explanation. Fouarge et al. (2013) find that low educated workers are less 
future oriented, have a higher preference for leisure, have a more external locus of control, and report 
a higher level of exam anxiety. They show that these traits predict a lower willingness to participate in 
training. These findings are in line with Colquitt et al.’s (2000) meta-analysis of the psychological 
literature on training motivation. They report that among others, locus of control, anxiety, and self-
efficacy are strongly related to training motivation. In turn, these traits have been shown to vary 
systematically with cognitive ability. Coleman and DeLeire (2003) show that internal locus of control 
is related to high cognitive ability. A high level of self-efficacy also correlates with high cognitive 
skills (Paunonen and Hong, 2010), while high levels of anxiety are related to lower cognitive 
performance (Ackerman and Heggestad, 1997). Thus, the explanation that high skilled and low skilled 
workers differ on traits related to willingness to participate in training is generally supported. 
The preference based explanation for differences in the incidence of training leaves little 
room for interventions aimed at improving low skilled employees. This is because personality and 
economic preferences have been found to be relatively stable over time (Meier and Sprenger, 2015; 
Borghans et al., 2008), and any meaningful change that does occur is usually related to significant life 
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events or internal maturation (Specht, Egloff, and Schmukle, 2011). It is unlikely that any intervention 
can have a lasting impact on workers’ underlying preferences. Indeed, the empirical evidence on the 
effects of policies intended to stimulate workers to take up training shows that low skilled workers are 
the least likely to make use of vouchers that significantly reduce the costs of training (Schwerdt, 
Messer, Woessmann, and Wolter, 2012). Even more discouragingly, Hidalgo, Oosterbeek, and 
Webbink (2014) find that those low skilled workers that do make use of vouchers are typically the 
type of low skilled worker that would have participated without the voucher, leading to large 
deadweight losses. This evidence suggests that cost-based interventions are not optimally designed to 
induce non-participating low-skilled workers to sign up for training. 
While preferences likely are part of the story of workers’ willingness to train, it is unclear 
how many of the current low skilled non-participants of training are never takers. We argue that part 
of the reason why cost-based interventions may be ineffective at increasing the participation rate of 
low skilled employees, is that there are additional signalling costs associated with training tailored 
towards low skilled workers. Participating in training that is effective at increasing productivity of low 
skilled workers, identifies those workers as having low initial skills. In jobs where productivity is 
(partly) unobservable, workers may be better off not taking this type of training even when it is 
effective and free of costs. The negative effect of divulging their initial skill level to the employer 
may outweigh the gains in productivity from training. In the next section, we formalize our argument 
by developing a signalling based model on workers’ decisions to enter on-the-job training programs. 
 
3. On the job training model 
In this section we describe our model. First, we introduce a single program model separately for basic 
and advanced training, and state our assumptions. Later, we describe a situation where employees can 
choose between different types of available training programs. 
The framework we adopt is similar to the standard signalling model (Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 
1975), where employers have imperfect information about their workers’ productivity, and workers 
can sign up for education (in this case on-the-job training) as a signal of their ability. Employees are 
paid according to their expected productivity, conditional on their training decision. Our model differs 
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from the standard signalling setup in the sense that on-the-job training can increase productivity if the 
level of training matches the level of the worker’s initial ability, and returns to training vary with 
initial ability. Thus, where in the standard job market signalling model differences in costs lead to 
(semi)separating equilibria, in our model differences in the productivity returns to training lead 
employees of different initial levels of ability to select into different types of training. 
3.1 Single training program model 
We assume that ability (𝑎) is uniformly and continuously distributed on [0,1] (similar to Spence 
(1974); Lang and Kropp (1986)). Each program has added value (𝑣(𝑎)), which is assumed to be linear 
in ability and consists of the fixed (𝑣0) and marginal returns (𝑣1). Those values are determined by the 
program characteristics: 
(1) 𝑣(𝑎) = 𝑣0 + 𝑣1𝑎. 
We assume that all of the available training programs are advanced or basic by design. The 
added value of basic training is decreasing with ability (𝑣1 < 0), so low ability employees benefit 
more from this training. Conversely, for advanced training programs the added value is increasing 
with ability (𝑣1 > 0), as employees with higher ability can learn more from these programs. 
By construction, fixed added value in (1) defines the gains of employees at the bottom of the 
ability distribution, since it outweighs marginal added value for low values of 𝑎. Analogously, 
marginal added value determines the gains of employees with high ability, and we assume that fixed 
and marginal added values are negatively correlated. An increase in marginal added value makes the 
training more beneficial for higher ability employees, and makes it less useful for low ability 
employees simultaneously. The same logic holds for an increase in fixed added value: by adjusting to 
serve the needs of employees with low ability, the training becomes less useful for high ability 
employees. 
The total costs of training include monetary costs and time investment. Following Spence 
(1973) we assume that costs decrease with ability, as the smarter individuals require less time to 
master the same material. However, the decreasing nature of the costs (𝑐) can be incorporated in net 
added value, subtracting them from (1), i.e. if 𝑐 = 𝑐0 − 𝑐1𝑎: 
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𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑡(𝑎) = (𝑣0 − 𝑐0) + (𝑣1 + 𝑐1)𝑎 = 𝑣0
′ + 𝑣1
′ 𝑎. 
Therefore, without loss of generality we can make a simplifying assumption that the costs are constant 
and equal 𝑐. 
We assume that worker productivity is not perfectly observed, and therefore individual ability 
and added value of training are private information. The information the market receives about an 
individual employee is whether or not he went into training, and general information about the 
program he took. Based on the information about the program, market agents form beliefs about the 
level of training. For example, programs that lead to a master’s degree equivalent will likely be 
inferred to be an advanced form of training, while a program labeled a ‘knowledge refreshment 
course’ is likely to be judged as basic. Using the available information, market agents make 
assumptions about the average level of ability of workers who did and did not participate in training. 
Here we analyse the extreme case when training participation is the only available source of 
information regarding ability.
1
 Market agents infer an employee’s ability from the type of training he 
takes. For example, an employee who signs up for advanced training, is expected to be of higher 
initial ability than a basic program participant. Therefore, employees take into account market beliefs 
when deciding to take the training. 
The decision to participate in training is a single period voluntary decision. Employees are 
rational to the extent that they choose an option with the highest benefit, i.e. the employee makes a 
decision to participate in training if gains from participating are higher than those from not 
participating.
 2
  
To distinguish between ability before and after training we refer to ability after the 
participation decision as knowledge: 
(2) 𝐾(𝑎) = {
𝑣0 + (1 + 𝑣1)𝑎 |     𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 
𝑎                 |         𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  
. 
                                                          
1
 In practice, employers form increasingly accurate beliefs about the productivity of their employees over time 
(Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Lange, 2007). However, for the results of our model to hold, productivity needs only 
be partially unobserved, as we show in Section 3.3. 
2 Without loss of generality we assume that if the employee is indifferent between taking and not taking the 
training, he will participate. 
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This means that for employees who do not take training, knowledge is equal to their initial ability. 
We assume that wages 𝑤(𝑎) are set at the level of observed employee’s productivity (𝑝(𝑎)): 
(3) 𝑤(𝑎) = 𝑝(𝑎). 
Since the equilibrium solution differs for different types of training, we look separately at 
both situations, starting with basic and continuing with advanced training. First, we predict 
participation in the ideal situation when productivity is perfectly observable, and training is only taken 
by those who benefit from it in terms of ability. Later we show how the results change once 
productivity becomes unobservable.  
3.1.1 Basic training 
We first consider a situation where productivity is perfectly observable (𝑝(𝑎) = 𝑎). In this 
case, a worker’s wage is equal to his ability. Training cannot be used for signaling and is only valued 
for the skills increase it provides, since the increase in ability translates into an employee’s wage 
raise. Therefore the training is only taken by employees, for whom the net added value of training is 
positive (𝑣(𝑎) − 𝑐 ≥ 0). Equating net added value to zero, we find the participation threshold ability 
(𝑎∗): 
𝑣(𝑎∗) − 𝑐 = 0, 
(4) 𝑎∗ =
𝑐−𝑣0
𝑣1
, 
where 𝑎∗ is defined as the ability level for which the gains from training are equal to the gains from 
not taking the training (zero in this case). 
As in this case added value only decreases with ability (𝑣1 < 0), all employees with ability 
lower than the threshold sign up for the training. Thus, the participation rate equals the threshold.  
Now let’s look at the situation where ability is not observable. 
Since individual ability is private information of the employee and training participation is the 
only available source of information, the best guess the market can make about a person’s knowledge 
is the average knowledge of people taking (or not taking) training ((𝐸𝐾(𝑎∗)𝑝 and 𝐸𝐾(𝑎
∗)𝑛𝑝 
respectively). Therefore, unlike in the previous case where employee’s wage was equal to his own 
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knowledge, his wage is equal to the average knowledge of the group taking training in case he signs 
up, and the average knowledge of the group not taking training otherwise: 
(5) 𝑤(𝑎) = {
𝐸𝐾(𝑎∗)𝑝  |        𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 
𝐸𝐾(𝑎∗)𝑛𝑝   |  𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 
. 
Everyone for whom the benefits from training exceed the benefits from not participating will 
take the training in equilibrium. The employee with marginal ability (𝑎∗), for whom the net benefits 
from going and not going into training are equal, is indifferent and, as mentioned before, is assumed 
to participate.  
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, all employees are indifferent between taking and not taking the 
training. 
Since in equilibrium the marginal employee (𝑎∗) is indifferent between two options, we find 
the participation threshold by equating the difference between wages and costs of training of the 
group taking training with wages of the group not taking training, and using (5): 
 𝑤(𝑎∗)𝑝 − 𝑐 = 𝑤(𝑎
∗)𝑛𝑝, 
(6) 𝐸𝐾(𝑎∗)𝑝 − 𝑐 = 𝐸𝐾(𝑎
∗)𝑛𝑝. 
Since (6) does not depend on 𝑎 directly, the benefits from going (not-going) into training are 
the same for everyone and boil down to the expected knowledge of each group (minus costs). This 
means that, in equilibrium, net benefits (wage minus costs of training) of training are the same for the 
entire employee pool and are equal to benefits (wages) of the group not taking the training. The 
equilibrium is determined by the number of employees in each group and their individual abilities. 
This situation is similar to the perfect competition theory in microeconomics, where the profits of an 
individual firm depend on the number of firms in the market. This mechanism regulates the number of 
operating firms. Similarly to our case, in the equilibrium all active firms receive zero profits (equal to 
the profits they would receive by not operating). 
Proposition 2. Participation rate of a basic training increases with an increase in added 
value and decreases with an increase in costs. 
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As 𝐸𝐾(𝑎∗)𝑝  ( 𝐸𝐾(𝑎
∗)𝑛𝑝 ) is the expected knowledge of the group taking (not taking) the 
training, 𝐾(0) is the knowledge level of the lowest ability employee, and 1 is the maximum possible 
ability, we can calculate the average knowledge of each group: 
(7) 𝐸𝐾(𝑎∗)𝑝 =
𝐾(0)+𝐾(𝑎∗)
2
, 
and 
(8) 𝐸𝐾(𝑎∗)𝑛𝑝 =
𝑎∗+1
2
. 
 Taking (2) into account we solve (6) for 𝑎∗: 
(9) 𝑎∗ =
2𝑐+1−2𝑣0
𝑣1
. 
Taking into account that 𝑣1 < 0, we see from (9) that the participation rate depends positively 
on added value parameters. When 𝑣0 is increasing, participants gain relatively more from the training. 
The same is true for an increase in 𝑣1 (decrease in absolute value). As the added value curve becomes 
flatter, on average total gains increase. Therefore both changes lead to increased participation in the 
program.  
Proposition 3. Basic training should be extremely effective or appeal to a wide audience in 
order to attract participants. 
We also notice that in order for a basic training program to attract participants (𝑎∗ to be 
positive), its net fixed added value should be higher than 
1
2
. Signing up for a basic training of this kind 
will signal low initial ability, for which the training should compensate by being effective enough to 
bring the lowest ability employees to an above average level. This extreme result is explained by our 
assumption that training participation is the only available source of information about productivity. 
Once we allow for more sources of information, the magnitude of the result becomes smaller (see 
Section 3.3). 
The negative signal associated with basic training implies that this type of training will attract 
few (if any) participants. This poses a problem for training programs aimed at low skilled employees. 
12 
 
For example, let’s assume that the aim is to improve the employees at the bottom 10% of the ability 
distribution and to bring them to the level just above this 10
th
 percentile. Our model shows that 
nobody will participate in the training due to the negative signal even if the training program is proven 
to be effective. Employers that aim to target the bottom of the distribution will therefore necessarily 
have to design their program so that it is appealing to a broader audience in order to induce their 
employees to participate. However, generalizing the program will decrease its efficiency in raising the 
quality at the low end of the distribution. While somewhat counterintuitive, decreasing the knowledge 
gained from training for those at the bottom of the distribution increases their willingness to 
participate. The other, less realistic, option would be to make the training so effective that low ability 
employees are better off after the training than not participating at all and being assumed to be 
average. 
Proposition 4. Imperfect information decreases the participation rate of the basic program. 
Now we compare this result with the hypothetical situation (4) without signaling discussed 
earlier. If we rewrite (9) we can treat the second term as a signaling stigma, reducing participation: 
𝑎∗ =
2𝑐−2𝑣0+1
𝑣1
=
𝑐−𝑣0
𝑣1
+
𝑐−𝑣0+1
𝑣1
. 
A graphical example of a basic training program is provided in Figure 1. The added value and 
costs of the training are: 𝑣0 = 0.7,  𝑣1 = −0.2, 𝑐 = 0.18. We see that the line of gross added value 
(𝑣(𝑎)) is always above the costs (𝑐), and therefore in the situation where productivity is observed and 
the training does not have any signaling value, all employees sign up for training, and the 
participation rate is 100%. Everyone improves their initial ability and shifts from 𝑎 (solid) to 𝐾(𝑎) 
(dash-dot) line. The knowledge after training curve (𝐾(𝑎)) is the sum of knowledge without training 
(𝛼) and added value of training (𝑣(𝑎)). If productivity is not observable, using the formulas derived 
earlier, we calculate that the stigma of the basic training reduces participation to 20% (𝑎∗). Employees 
with initial ability below 𝑎∗ take the training and their knowledge shifts to the 𝐾(𝑎), while employees 
with initial ability higher than 𝑎∗ stay on 𝑎. The thick dashed black line is used to show the 
knowledge distribution in the market in equilibrium. 
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Figure #1. Basic course equilibrium 
 
 
3.1.2 Advanced training 
Similar to the previous section we first analyze a situation where signaling is not applicable. Since we 
use the same formulas, the participation threshold is the same as for the basic program: 
𝑎∗ =
𝑐 − 𝑣0
𝑣1
. 
In this case employees with initial ability higher than 𝑎∗ take the training, therefore the 
participation rate equals 1 − 𝑎∗.  
Now we consider the situation where ability is not observable and employees can sign up for 
training to signal their ability. Since the program is assumed to be advanced and highly able 
employees benefit from it the most, smart individuals are expected to sign up. Therefore, if for a 
particular employee the net added value of the training is negative (added value is lower than the 
costs), but at the same time his knowledge after training is lower than the average knowledge of 
employees attending that training, he can signal high knowledge just by subscribing to that training. 
Therefore, because of the positive signal, more employees are expected to take the training program 
than just those that benefit from it in terms of increased ability.  
Proposition 5. Participation rate of an advanced training increases with increases in added 
value and decreases with an increase in costs. 
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Again the threshold is derived from (6), but this time representations for expected knowledge 
of the groups are different due to the fact that the tails of the distribution for which the training is most 
and least beneficial change places: 
𝐸𝐾(𝑎∗)𝑝 =
𝐾(1)+𝐾(𝑎∗)
2
  and  𝐸𝐾(𝑎∗)𝑛𝑝 =
𝑎∗+0
2
. 
𝐾(1) is the knowledge level of the employee with the highest ability and 0 is the lowest possible 
ability. Then the threshold is 
(10) 𝑎∗ =
2(𝑐−𝑣0)−𝑣1−1
𝑣1
, 
and the participation rate is 
(11) 1 − 𝑎∗ =
2(𝑣1+𝑣0−𝑐)+1
𝛼1
. 
Here again the participation rate depends positively on added value parameters and negatively 
on the costs. The underlying intuition is the same as in the previous case. An increase in added value 
makes more employees better off taking the training and shifts the threshold to the left, increasing the 
participation rate.  
Proposition 6. The decision to go into training does not have to be related to program 
effectiveness and can have a pure signaling effect. 
We notice that for low fixed added value (𝑣0) and marginal returns (𝑣1), in the equilibrium 
without signaling nobody signs up for training because the net benefits are negative. However, when 
employees’ productivity is unobservable and signaling is possible, employees do go into training, 
because they benefit in terms of wages. If the program is useless but assumed to be for highly able 
individuals, it provides an opportunity for employees to signal high ability. Therefore, employees at 
the margin will sign up for a program from which they gain no knowledge if the program is assumed 
to be advanced. 
Proposition 7. Advanced training programs are oversubscribed. 
Now let’s rewrite (10) to compare it with (4) and see what happens to the threshold due to 
signaling: 
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𝑎∗ =
𝑐−𝑣0
𝑣1
+
𝑐−𝑣0−1−𝑣1
𝑣1
. 
We see that the threshold is lower and more employees are participating, including those for 
whom training is too costly in addition to those who would take the training without signaling.  
Figure 2 provides an example of an advanced program. The added value parameters and costs 
are: 𝑣0 = 0.18,  𝑣1 = 0.1, and 𝑐 = 0.76. We see that for any ability level the costs are higher than 
total added value. Therefore in the case when worker’s productivity is observable, nobody signs up 
for the training and the participation threshold 𝑎∗ = 1. In the case worker’s productivity is not 
observable, participation rate rises to 40% (𝑎∗ = 0.6), entirely due to the positive signal. Again, the 
thick dashed black line shows the knowledge distribution in the market. 
 
Figure #2. Advanced course equilibrium 
 
3.2 Multiple training programs model 
So far we discussed a situation where employees can only choose one training program. Now we 
extend the model to a situation where employees can choose between an advanced and a basic 
program. We assign additional indices 𝑖 = 1 to the parameters corresponding to a basic training and 
𝑖 = 2 to the parameters of an advanced training. Added value and costs of training are now denoted 
as: 
𝑣𝑖(𝑎) = 𝑣0𝑖 + 𝑣1𝑖𝑎 and 𝑐𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑖 = 1,2. 
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Now employees can choose between three options: basic training, advanced training, and no 
training. Each option provides a signal, as described in the previous section. As the nature of the 
programs does not change, we assume that in equilibrium some employees from the bottom of the 
distribution take basic training (with abilities below some 𝑎1
∗), and some from the top take an 
advanced one (with abilities above some 𝑎2
∗). Then two cases are possible. First, employees in the 
middle of the distribution (between 𝑎1
∗ and 𝑎2
∗) are better off not taking any training and there are two 
different thresholds 𝑎1
∗ and 𝑎2
∗  (Figure 3). Second, there is full training participation and only one 
threshold 𝑎∗. Employees with ability lower than 𝑎∗ take basic training and employees with ability 
above 𝑎∗ take an advanced one (Figure 4).  
 
Figure #3. Multiple courses 2-threshold equilibrium 
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Figure #4. Multiple courses 1-threshold equilibrium 
 
 
Proposition 8. Parameters of different programs affect each other’s participation. 
We start with the first situation. The threshold of the basic program is strictly lower than the 
threshold of the advanced program (𝑎1
∗ < 𝑎2
∗). Rewriting (6) for both programs gives a system of 
equations: 
(12) {
𝐸𝐾1(𝑎1
∗) − 𝑐1 = 𝐸𝐾𝑛𝑝(𝑎1
∗; 𝑎2
∗)
𝐸𝐾2(𝑎2
∗) − 𝑐2 = 𝐸𝐾𝑛𝑝(𝑎1
∗; 𝑎2
∗)
. 
Solving for 𝑎1
∗ and 𝑎2
∗: 
(13) {
𝑎1
∗ =
2𝑣02+𝑣12[2𝑣01+1−2𝑐1]+1−2𝑐2
1−𝑣11𝑣12
𝑎2
∗ =
2𝑣01+𝑣11[2𝑣02+𝑣12+1−2𝑐2]−2𝑐1
1−𝑣11𝑣12
. 
We can see from the parametrical representations of 𝑎1
∗ and 𝑎2
∗  that each threshold depends on 
the specifics of both programs.  
Proposition 9. Interventions targeting advanced training have an indirect effect on demand 
for basic training. 
For example, if the advanced training program gets better (increase in fixed or marginal added 
value), the share of participants of the basic program increases (together with its threshold). It also 
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increases with a decrease in costs of the advanced program. Improvements in design of the advanced 
program (↑𝑣2) as well as availability to a wider audience (↓𝑐2) boost demand for the basic program 
without any direct interventions. 
The mechanism behind this result is the following. A rise in 𝑣02 or 𝑣12 and a drop in 𝑐2 make 
the advanced program appealing to more employees and shifts the participation threshold to the left 
(𝑎2
∗). As 𝑎2
∗  is also a right margin of the group not taking the training, its average ability decreases 
(↓ 𝐸𝐾𝑛𝑝). As a result, the expected wage of the group not taking any training goes down, while the 
wage of the group taking basic training does not change. Therefore for employees with abilities close 
to the threshold 𝑎1
∗, who were better off not taking basic training, the option of taking it is now 
relatively better. This shifts 𝑎1
∗ to the right, which increases both the participation rate and the average 
knowledge of employees who take the basic training (↑ 𝐸𝐾1).  
Proposition 10.  Increased participation of a basic training reduces the positive signal of an 
advanced training. 
Conversely, higher added value of basic training (↑ 𝑣01, 𝑣11) and lower costs (↓ 𝑐1) lead to a 
higher participation threshold (↑ 𝑎2
∗) and a lower participation rate of the advanced program (↓ 1 −
𝑎2
∗). However, as in the previous case, only employees close to margin (𝑎2
∗) are affected. Therefore 
only employees who sign up purely because of the signal choose not to participate in the program, and 
sorting into training becomes more efficient. 
Proposition 11. Different training programs mutually reduce the absolute value of each 
other’s signal. 
Comparing (9) and (11) with (13) we see that both training programs mutually reduce the 
absolute value of each other’s signal. Moreover, improvements in basic or advanced training alone 
affect participants of both types of programs, as well as employees not taking training at all. 
As mentioned above, this holds for the situation where 𝑎1
∗ < 𝑎2
∗ . Plugging representations for 
𝑎1
∗ and 𝑎2
∗  from (13) into this inequality we get 
(14) 2[ 𝑣01 − 𝑣02 + 𝑐2 − 𝑐1] − 1 − 𝑣12[2𝑣01 + 1 − 2𝑐1] + 𝑣11[2𝑣02 + 𝑣12 + 1 − 2𝑐2] > 0. 
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(14) can be used as a condition to distinguish between full and partial participation. If (14) 
holds, we are in the first case and 𝑎1
∗ < 𝑎2
∗ . Otherwise, if the left-hand side of (14) is less or equal to 
zero we get the second case and 𝑎1
∗ = 𝑎2
∗ = 𝑎∗. To find out participation threshold, we substitute 𝑎1
∗ 
and 𝑎2
∗ with 𝑎∗ in (12) and get 
(15) 𝑎∗ =
2(𝑣01−𝑣02+𝑐2−𝑐1)−1−𝑣12
𝑣12−𝑣11
. 
In this situation all employees sign up for training: employees with ability lower than 
𝑎∗choose the basic training program, and employees with higher ability sign up for the advanced 
program. It is clear from (15) that the participation threshold positively (negatively) depends on the 
added value of the basic (advanced) training and negatively (positively) on the costs of the basic 
(advanced) one. This is quite intuitive, as due to the full participation, an increase in the added value 
(as well as decrease in costs) of the basic program attracts employees who were better off signing up 
for the advanced training. Therefore the threshold just shifts to the left. 
3.3 Multiple signals 
So far in this chapter we introduced two simple cases where an employee’s productivity is either 
perfectly observed or not observed at all, and the training program is the only available source of 
information about ability. In practice, however, agents usually have additional ways to infer 
employees’ ability (e.g. personal observations, characteristics such as work experience). Therefore it 
is logical to include more sources of information into the model.  
We assume that in the general case, employee’s observed productivity (𝑝(a)) is a combination 
of the signal of a training program (𝐸𝐾(𝑎∗)) and information about knowledge (𝐾(𝑎)) from other 
sources: 
𝑝(𝑎) = 𝜆𝐸𝐾𝑖(𝑎𝑖
∗) + (1 − 𝜆)𝐾(𝑎),   𝑖 = 1,2, 
where 𝜆 ∈ [0,1] characterizes information asymmetry in the market and can be perceived as weight of 
the signal of the training program in employee’s wage. If 𝜆 = 1, we are in the case of perfect 
asymmetry analysed in detail earlier. With a decrease in 𝜆 the importance of the signal of the training 
program decreases, as information from other sources becomes more reliable. Although a decrease in 
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𝜆 attenuates the signal of training compared to (5), it is clear that, while becoming smaller in 
magnitude, all the results of the model still hold. 
 
4. Empirical predictions 
The results from our model lead to several empirically testable predictions. In this section we suggest 
some ways to validate our model. We also discuss how the predictions of our model differ from 
predictions following from the human capital, preferences, personality, and motivation based models. 
First, in professions where productivity is easier to observe, low skilled employees should sort 
into training more often than in professions where productivity is harder to observe. This prediction is 
somewhat related to Riley’s (1979) finding that in jobs where productivity is observable, wages are 
less strongly related to workers’ level of education. In other words, employers disregard the signal 
sent through the education (in our case training) decision and set their wages based on the level of 
productivity they observe. Therefore, when productivity is observable, signalling has no value, and 
sorting into training should solely be based on predicted gains in productivity.  
Second, we note that the penalty from sending a negative signal is greater at certain points in 
a worker’s career. In our model, we assumed for simplicity that the signal each course sends is valued 
equally among all employees. However, those for whom the evaluation by their employer is more 
important in terms of their future employment, benefit more from not signalling low quality. In terms 
of the model, these employees will put relatively more weight on the value of the signal (𝐸𝐾(𝑎∗)𝑝) 
than on the gains in actual knowledge (𝐾(𝑎)). In practice, this implies that employees who are on 
fixed-term contracts are less likely to sort into basic courses than employees that are on permanent 
contracts. When the signal gains importance relative to actual gains in knowledge, it also means that 
sorting into training becomes less efficient. At the high participation threshold, employees will 
undertake training which adds nothing in terms of knowledge for the positive signal. At the low 
participation threshold, employees who would gain knowledge from basic training will not take it 
because of the negative signal.  
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A strongly related prediction is that, considering employers form increasingly accurate beliefs 
of their employees’ productivity over time (Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Lange, 2007), workers have 
more influence over their perceived quality early in the employment relationship. Therefore, our 
model predicts less participation in basic courses with negative signalling value for employees in 
companies that have come under new management. Again, we would expect that this effect is stronger 
for employees on fixed term contracts.  
Importantly, the preceding predictions diverge from predictions made by the human capital 
model and models that considers individual differences as the main factor in explaining differences in 
training participation of low skilled workers. If individual differences would drive training 
participation, there should not be a difference in training behaviour related to contract status or length 
of the employment relationship. Each employee would sort into the training program that increases 
their productivity most effectively, regardless of the signal (provided that the returns to training would 
outweigh the costs). However individual differences may still explain differences in training 
participation between low skilled workers across occupations because of non-random selection into 
occupations. For example, it could be the case that a preference for work in which performance is 
observable is related to training motivation. 
Furthermore, because the existence of multiple courses targeted at different parts of the ability 
distribution reduces the signaling value of each individual course, companies that offer a higher 
variety of training programs will have a higher training participation rate of their low skilled workers. 
As we have shown before, adding the option of an advanced course to a choice set consisting only of 
basic courses reduces the average ability of those employees who do not sort into any training. This 
decreases the negative signal associated with signing up for a basic course, increasing participation in 
this course. A related prediction is that, because the existence of advanced courses increases 
participation in basic courses, companies that offer advanced training opportunities will have a higher 
level of average worker productivity. This holds regardless of the effectiveness of the advanced 
training programs, provided that the basic course is effective.  
Again, these predictions differ from predictions made by a model based on individual 
preferences for training or the human capital model. If individual differences drive training 
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participation, or the decision to enter training is purely based on the costs and predicted returns of that 
particular course, the existence of an advanced course should not influence participation in a basic 
course when there are no signalling effects. If sorting into training is based only on gains in 
productivity, the existence of a course that is dominated in terms of gains should not influence the 
rational employee’s sorting decision under the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption.  
 
5. Concluding comments 
Preference based explanations for the observed low training incidence of low skilled workers leave 
little potential for interventions aimed at increasing their productivity through on-the-job training. We 
offer a novel, signalling based explanation of training participation, where low skilled workers do not 
sign up for training because of the negative signal training participation conveys about their initial 
ability. We argue that training can increase productivity when workers’ prior knowledge matches the 
level of the training course. Consequently, in jobs where performance is (partly) unobservable, 
employers can use observed training participation as information about the quality of their employees. 
This implies that training programs aimed at low ability workers will be underused.  
In contrast with the preference based explanation, approaching on-the-job training from a 
signalling perspective offers potential for interventions. Because courses have spillover effects and 
mutually affect each other’s participation rates, companies and policy makers can increase the training 
participation of their low skilled employees by offering a variety of courses. The existence of an 
advanced course increases participation in basic courses, as the average ability of workers that do not 
take any training decreases. As a result, basic training becomes relatively more attractive for workers 
at the bottom of the skills distribution. 
Our model provides an explanation for why low skilled workers participate less in training, 
and offers suggestions to increase their participation. However, empirical research should address the 
question whether our model can explain observed training participation patterns before policy makers 
take up suggestions based on theory alone. For this reason, we make several empirical predictions that 
diverge from predictions made by human capital and preference based models. Ultimately, when 
workers use training as a signal in practice, insights from our model can help companies and policy 
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makers in designing the most efficient implementation strategy for their on-the-job training programs 
targeting their low skilled employees. 
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